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COMMUNICATION AMONG COMPETITORS:
GAME THEORY AND ANTITRUST
Dennis W. Carlton, Robert H. Gertner" ,
and Andrew M. Rosenfield'
INTRODUCTION
Advances in technology have greatly reduced communications costs.
Businesses are often able, at low cost, to make information available to
consumers and investors and, either advertently or inadvertently, to
competitors as well. This ease of dissemination and resultant proliferation
of information makes antitrust policy towards communication among com-
petitors of growing importance.
Direct and indirect communication among competitors often is at-
tacked under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In some cases, plaintiffs at-
tempt to characterize practices centered upon informational activities as
constituting an illegal "agreement" to which the "per se" rule against price
fixing should apply. However, most information cases are simply not ame-
nable to straightforward applications of the per se rule. The rationale un-
derlying the per se rule against price fixing is the judicial economy asso-
ciated with the condemnation of practices so "economically pernicious"
and so lacking in any "redeeming social virtue" that their complete elimi-
nation is highly unlikely to hinder socially productive practices. This
rationale is not applicable to most information cases.
We endorse the condemnation of explicit price fixing and market
allocation schemes, as illustrated for example by the formation of "naked"
cartels where the sole purpose is to raise price. Such schemes rarely benefit
consumers. Naked cartels are rightfully condemned as per se violations of
the Sherman Act and are routinely described by courts as illegal agree-
ments.' However, attempts to determine the legality of many forms of
communication by assessing whether or not they conform to some connota-
tion of the word "agreement" are inappropriate-at least when viewed
from the vantage point of economics. Game theory has taught us that it
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See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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can be difficult to unambiguously define "agreement" when examining
conduct among economic agents when no express exchange of enforceable
assurances has occurred. To explain, legally enforceable contracts consti-
tute agreements in the sense that each side knows what it is obligated to do
and knows that if it breaches, it faces a penalty that will be enforced by
courts--either specific performances or damages.
But what does "agreement" mean in the absence of a legally en-
forceable contract? Initially it seems sensible to determine that there is an
"agreement" if competitors meet to set price and to restrict aggregate out-
put and the meeting ends with an understanding of what each party is to
do, and then each does what it promised. From an evidentiary standpoint,
it is even more compelling if absent the "agreement" the outcome would
have been much different. However, this is a determination of "agreement"
that requires a causal analysis, an analysis of the "but for" world, and need
not be simple to apply.
A very different case from explicit price fixing is presented when
there is only evidence of mutual interdependence in pricing along with
communication such as public statements of industry-wide events-for
example, a public prediction by one or more firms that there is likely to be
a glut of memory chips for the next ten months followed by a number of
industry participants taking factory "downtime." Or alternatively, consider
the ubiquitous display of information and knowledge among competitors
at a trade show or convention. There may be no evidence that any detailed
discussion on price or output took place or that any of the meetings had an
effect on a firm's decisions. Much of the practice in Section 1 litigation re-
volves around a plaintiff's attempt to characterize facts like these as if they
were equivalent to an express illegal cartel "agreement."
This problem-called the issue of "characterization"-cannot be
solved in the communication context merely by using the "agreement" con-
cept, because "agreement" does not have a sufficiently clear economic (or,
in our view, even legal) meaning which allows one to decide independent
of the industry facts whether a particular form of communication should be
banned. There is, in general, no economic theory of the meaning of "agree-
ment" wherein one may determine easily when communication leads to
anticompetitive results irrespective of the context of the events. Nor do we
think this is the right problem to solve.
We argue below that in the absence of direct evidence to form a
"naked" cartel to restrict output or to raise price, the appropriate legal stan-
dard to judge the flow of information among competitors is the rule of rea-
son.2 Courts (and economists) should analyze how a specific type of
2 Although agreeing that there is scope for a per se rule, we wish to draw narrowly the ac-
tivities that fall within it, at least given our current knowledge and experience. For reasons explained
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communication did in fact affect prices and output in a specific market set-
ting. Using the per se sledgehammer to attack such communication without
analysis of context or effect, by trying to label it an "illegal agreement," is
not helpful and, in our judgement, is not wise.
Game-theoretic models of industrial organization can provide guidance
on what to investigate in rule of reason analysis of information cases.
These models yield insights into how different forms of communication
can affect competition in a market. We analyze the following factors in
assessing the effect of the communication on competition: recipi-
ents--competitors or competitors and customers; timing-historical actions
and outcomes, current actions and market conditions, or future actions; and
frequency---repeated or not. Our analysis in this paper points to the poten-
tial mechanisms by which the communication may affect market outcomes.
Application of the rule of reason would necessarily include an analysis of
many facts and factors including, importantly, the actual effects of the spe-
cific communication practices at issue in the specific market in which they
occur. Our analysis derives sets of conditions under which an effect on
competitive outcomes is consistent with economic reasoning.
I. THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF THE PER SE RULE
The economic logic of the per se rule is that certain practices, such as
the establishment among competitors of a "naked" cartel, are so unlikely
to be procompetitive that the judicial efficiency of immediate condemna-
tion without any detailed inquiry into the effects of the scheme outweighs
the cost of banning any "efficient" or procompetitive cartels.' In the often-
quoted language of the Supreme Court, practices that have a "pernicious
effect on competition and lack any redeeming virtue" may be condemned
per se because the cost of condemnation is slight and the benefit in judicial
economy is great.4 Courts since Addyston Pipe and Trans-Missouri, for ex-
ample, have refused to analyze the reasonableness of a particular price or
output restriction among competitors based on defenses such as "ruinous
competition" and "fair price," concluding that the costs of any such inqui-
ries into the effects of cartels or their pricing behavior outweigh any possi-
ble benefits.
Not all actions among competitors that restrict aspects of competition
are analogous to express collusion, however. Courts have confronted the
more fully later, we believe that much activity in the communication area is likely to be
procompetitive.
' The classic statement is United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). In
particular, see the famous footnote 59.
4 See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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difficult problems posed by practices in which a restraint of trade is neces-
sary to promote competition. Thus, limits on the scope of the per se rule
in this context have been evolving in a series of cases beginning with Chi-
cago Board of Trade,5 and running through ASCAP 6 and NCAA.7 Courts
have stated that the tradeoff which drives the per se rule does not apply in
many of these more complex situations.
Even if a practice bears a close resemblance (perhaps even an iden-
tity) to a "naked price fixing agreement," that label will give way if there
is a reason to believe that the practice is not "inherently pernicious," or,
put differently, if the practice might well be output-enhancing. That is why
the per se rule was not applied in the Board of Trade, ASCAP and NCAA
cases, in spite of claims in each case that literal "price fixing" and express
(indeed, contractual) agreements among competitors were involved. Be-
cause particular features of these practices made their effect on output un-
certain, a detailed rule of reason analysis was required. In the Board of
Trade and ASCAP cases, the Court concluded that the effects of agree-
ments among rivals, that plaintiffs challenged as express price-fixing
agreements, were to increase output and, thus, the challenged practices
were found to be reasonable. In NCAA, the Court applied the rule of
reason, but found that output likely had been restricted and deemed the
challenged practice unreasonable.
Certain recent antitrust developments, however, illustrate efforts to
expand the per se rule to ambiguous settings. A good example is the recent
investigation by the Antitrust Division of numerous airlines for "price fix-
ing" in connection with the posting of fares by computer. The logic of this
charge was that by posting and altering fares and classification codes on
electronic bulletin boards, the airlines reached "agreement" with each other
about fares. With the expansion of the internet driving communication
costs lower, such cases are likely to continue to arise in the future.
The calculus which leads to applying the per se rule against price
fixing, in our view, should not apply to many-probably most-forms of
communication among competitors, such as posting prices on electronic
bulletin boards and the internet, or sharing demand and cost information.
That is because such communication can also bring significant benefits.
The incremental anticompetitive harm of many of these practices may be
less than their incremental procompetitive benefits. The effects of banning
these practices is unclear without a detailed economic analysis of the in-
dustry in which they occur. Such an analysis must consider the ability to
structure a remedy which leads to greater consumer welfare.
s Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
6 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
' NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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Under current antitrust practice, the attempts to characterize coopera-
tive outcomes, parallel actions, and ambiguous communication as if it were
the same as a cartel agreement, so as to involve the per se approach, does
not result in inexpensive litigation and a straightforward legal standard for
judge and jury. Recall that an important part of the calculus favoring the
per se rule is its elimination of complex litigation by dispensing with
detailed practice-by-practice and market-by-market analysis of effect. This
does not occur when per se claims are part of a Section 1 case involving
indirect communication that might bring potential benefits to consumers.
In such cases, market- and practice-specific facts and a huge amount of
evidence on effect of the challenged practices routinely are presented to a
jury, which is then instructed to apply the per se rule if "agreement" is
found and the rule of reason otherwise. This makes it impossible to claim
that per se analysis is an economical time- or resource-saving rule.
The per se rule should be reserved for practices that have three com-
ponents: (1) there is an extremely high likelihood-almost a certainty--that
the practice can have only an anticompetitive effect and, thus, virtually no
likelihood that forbidding the practice will injure competition; (2) it is very
difficult and costly to investigate claims of procompetitive versus
anticompetitive effect, making a per se approach economical (especially in
light of (1) above); and (3) the practice can be defimed specifically enough
so that companies can identify what they are, and are not, allowed to do.8
If these conditions are not met, we believe that the inquiry should
proceed under the rule of reason without prospect of per se instructions.
This will allow focus on the incremental procompetitive or anticompetitive
effects of the practice in question. The analysis should focus on whether
the practice raised price or restricted output, not on its label.
Given the rationale for the per se rule, it is essential that market
participants and courts easily be able to identify and quickly condemn
those activities that are per se illegal. Meeting with competitors to establish
a cartel to set price and to restrict output is an easily understood activity
that is easy to forbid without prospect of confusion or mistake. However,
responding to competitors' pricing by posting price changes on an elec-
tronic bulletin board does not have such clear borders. Certainly it cannot
s There can be benefits to coordinated price setting. That is one reason why firms with no
market power can and do merge. One cannot argue, therefore, that a per se rule against price fixing
bans a practice wholly lacking in efficiency. Instead, it forces the benefits to occur only where firms
publicly combine, making their joint activities known to customers. In order to support the per se
ban on price fixing, one must argue that, in general, the benefits of coordinated price setting are
likely to be small, costly to discover, outweighed by harms from elevated pricing and, in any event,
obtainable through other means such as public joint ventures or mergers which always are analyzed
under the rule of reason. Hence, the practice of express price fixing is condemned under the per se
rule even among firms lacking in market power.
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always be a criminal violation to post prices on an electronic bulletin
board, nor can it always be a criminal violation to respond to a compet-
itor's prices. For these reasons, the rule of reason is the correct approach
to new situations involving dissemination of information about prices; cur-
rently, there is insufficient experience and knowledge to classify these
practices as ones that should be banned in all cases.
II. THE EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC INTERDEPENDENCE ON PRICING
The industrial organization literature shows that oligopolists who
understand that their fortunes are fundamentally interdependent sometimes
can achieve high price-cost margins even without the formation of an ex-
press cartel.9 This can occur absent any direct communication among com-
petitors. A highly-stylized example illustrates this point. A small town has
two gasoline stations. They are located directly across the street from each
other at the town's main intersection and are identical in terms of capacity,
ancillary services, and quality of product. Almost all consumers will
therefore buy from the lower-priced station. Prices are posted on pumps
and large electronic signs; they can be changed virtually immediately and
costlessly by typing in new numbers."
If we assume, for the sake of the example, that entry cannot occur,
one likely outcome of "competition" is that each station will charge the
price that maximizes joint profits-the same price they would charge if
they could merge. Neither gasoline station has an incentive to cut price
below the monopoly level. Each realizes that it cannot steal customers
from its competitor before its competitor can respond. And the competitor
will respond because it is more profitable to match the price cut and share
the market at a lower price than to permit the price-cutting station to steal
market share. Each station should rationally anticipate immediate matching
and, therefore, not cut price in the first instance. Cooperative pricing is
thus a logical outcome of the "game" without any secret meetings or addi-
tional communication. If for some reason the joint profit-maximizing price
were to rise, one station could raise price. Although the other station likes
getting all the business, it should know that if it does not raise price to its
competitor's level, the competitor will surely lower price very soon. Thus,
9 See, e.g., DENNiS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRiAL ORGANIZA-
TION chs. 6-7 (1994).
'0 See Robert H. Gertner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Price-Fixing Under the Sherman Act The
New Learning from Game Theory (draft 1996) (on file with author), for a fuller discussion of this
and other examples in a general analysis of the relation of game theory to Section 1 litigation.
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it should even be possible to coordinate a price increase in this setting."
This analysis is certainly not new. 2
It is very unlikely that this behavior would create antitrust liability for
the gas stations and most people would say that there is no "agreement"
between them. Instead, there is what economists call a recognition on the
part of each firm of their "mutual interdependence." In this setting, unilat-
eral interest, by itself, leads to cooperative pricing. There is however cer-
tainly "communication" between the gas stations. Price information is com-
municated to competitors and consumers simultaneously. Although the
communication may make cooperative pricing more likely, it is also the
case that the information is useful to consumers.
This example demonstrates that cooperation and parallel behaviors are
possible without secret communication about price or output and without
"agreements." Immediate communication of prices to competitors can,
therefore, facilitate cooperative pricing. We will return to this example
later in the article.
It is very unclear whether the antitrust laws can or should do anything
about cooperative pricing based on mutual interdependence and collateral
interest. Restrictions on posting prices might not lead to any improvement
in social welfare, because consumers would be poorly informed. 3 Restric-
tions on price changes may not only eliminate the ability of the gas sta-
tions to cooperate, but also reduce their ability to respond to changes in
cost and demand conditions. Moreover, if we were to treat interdependence
that leads to parallel pricing as if it were price-fixing and therefore illegal
per se, entry into a monopolized or oligopoly market likely would become
less attractive. The benefits of entry would likely be foregone because of
the entrant's fear of potential felony exposure and possible treble damage
claims in the hands of consumers. A per se rule against parallel pricing,
therefore, could well have perverse dynamic effects on the exercise of mar-
ket power and consumer welfare."
The ease with which the gas stations can achieve cooperative prices
without a cartel-like illegal agreement affects the incremental effect of any
communication. For instance, mere discussions about future market condi-
tions may have a net procompetitive effect in this setting. The inventory
" Clearly, the model is very special, but the result does not depend on the products being
perfect substitutes. Robert H. Gertner, Tacit Collusion with Immediate Responses: The Role of
Asymmetries (draft 1994) (on file with author).
12 It was discussed by Edward Chamberlin in his classic 1933 book which developed the the-
ory of monopolistic competition, THE THEORY OF MONOPOuSTIC COMPErTION (1933).
'" Studies often show that removal of advertising bans on prices leads to lower prices. See,
e.g., Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & ECON 337, 352
(1972).
" See Gertner & Rosenfield, supra note 10, for a fuller discussion of this point.
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planning benefits, in this instance, may outweigh any anticompetitive
effects, simply because the communication is not neededto achieve coop-
erative pricing. In other settings the net effect of similar communication
may be anticompetitive.
11. NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS
Modem industrial organization, with its use of game theory, has much
to say about the potential effects of communication on outcomes. No court
will enforce a price-fixing contract, and this was generally true in the
United States even before the passage of the Sherman Act. 5 Therefore, to
have any incremental effect, the Sherman Act must attack something other
than written cartel contracts that already were unenforceable. One obvious
added incremental effect was to turn such behavior into a crime and to
give all direct consumers a treble damage claim for all injuries caused "by
reason of' price-fixing.
In any event, however, our central point is that any behavior which
arises from interdependence and which cannot be enforced by contract,
must be largely "self-enforcing" to raise any practical concern. That is, it
must be in the interest of each party to any cartel to take agreed upon ac-
tions independent of legal recourse by the other parties to compel perfor-
mance or the cartel will disintegrate. If this was not the case, a party could
behave opportunistically, and there would be nothing the other parties
could do about it, generally leading to no effect from interdependence or
even an express cartel.
A common interpretation of the basic solution concept in game
theory-Nash equilibrium-is that it represents a form of "self-enforcing
agreement." A Nash equilibrium is simply a set of strategies such that each
player's strategy is optimal given that other players choose their optimal
strategies. Therefore, a "self-enforcing agreement" is equivalent to a Nash
equilibrium. If the players were to get together prior to playing a game to
agree on strategies to play but were unable to write enforceable contracts,
the set of agreements they could reach defines the Nash equilibria of the
game. But even if the players did not get together beforehand, a Nash
equilibrium represents a standard assumed outcome of game theory. The
relevant question for us is whether there is a difference between the two
equilibria.
If Nash equilibrium provides a good prediction of outcomes in
strategic settings, then the Nash equilibrium that emerges in the "com-
" See Craft v. MeConoughy, 79 111. 346 (1875); Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 391, 442 (1975).
[Vol. 5:3
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petitors do not communicate" setting and the one that emerges if they do
communicate prior to playing the game is the precise measure of the effect
of the communication. 6 Market outcomes, compared and contrasted with
textbook indicia of perfectly competitive conditions, often are used as cir-
cumstantial evidence of "illegal agreement" in Section 1 litigation. 7 If the
outcome with no communication is the same as the one with express price-
fixing, one must treat such evidence as of very little probative value. The
link between Nash equilibrium and self-enforcing agreements suggests that,
in many settings, communication without an ability to write a legally-
enforceable contract is unlikely to have any effect on strategies or out-
comes. The most important way in which communication can affect strate-
gies or outcomes is that it may transfer information which changes the
game the firms play in an important way. In Section V, we show how
game theory can identify those situations where communication is most
likely to provide competitors with an extra ability to raise prices which
would be relevant in a rule of reason analysis.
IV. THE NET EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION ON COMPETITION
We demonstrate, in this section, how the game-theoretic industrial
organization literature 9 suggests at least three factors that should play a
large role in any rule of reason analysis of communication. An under-
standing of the mechanisms by which communication may affect outcomes
can help courts fashion rules which address the impact of communication
across a variety of competitive environments.
" There is the issue of how accurate are predictions from game theory. As with any theory
based on simplifications, predictions are unlikely to be precise. It is also possible that players will
not choose Nash equilibrium strategies or that there will be many Nash equilibria, so that the theory
may not provide a precise prediction of behavior. Even though the predictions may not be precise,
they still can provide useful guidance on when equilibria may differ.
'" Two studies, Dennis A. Yao & Susan S. DeSanti, Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of
Tacit Collusion, 38 ANTITRusT BULL. 113, 141 (1993); and Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act
Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory,
38 AIrTrRUST BULL. 143, 219 (1993), recognize the difficulties in inferring price-fixing from mar-
ket outcomes.
" There are two other ways that communication could affect outcomes. Pre-play communi-
cation in a game could reduce strategic uncertainty if players' statements about playing their Nash
equilibrium strategies are believed. If a player is more confident that other players will choose their
Nash strategies, it is more attractive to do so oneself. Thus, communication could increase the likeli-
hood of Nash outcomes. Similarly, if there are many Nash equilibria, as is the case in many dynam-
ic oligopoly models, pre-play communication may improve the players' ability to coordinate on a
particular Nash equilibrium. We suspect it may be difficult to show that these mechanisms are at
work in a particular industry setting.
" See generally CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 9, chs. 6-7; JEAN TtROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988); HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989).
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First, whether or not the communication is public is important because
consumers may benefit from the information externalized. However, this
does not mean that the exchange among rivals of information that is not
public should necessarily be subjected to a per se rule-just the opposite.
Despite our suspicions about secret communication among rivals, we
would apply the rule of reason in this context as well. This is because even
an exchange of private information (e.g., of cost information) among com-
petitors can reduce the dispersion or even the level of price. This private
exchange of information is not certain to be anticompetitive and, further-
more, consumers may be uninterested in the information.'
Second, whether the information is about historical or current strate-
gies and outcomes can be very important. The mechanisms by which com-
munication of information can affect outcomes differs depending upon
what type of information is disseminated.
Finally, the question of repetition and reputation, especially relating to
communication of future actions, may be very important. In many settings,
repeated communication may be necessary to achieve credibility of the in-
formation or to make the information useful in facilitating cooperative pric-
ing. We discuss these issues in some detail below.
A. Public Communication of Current Market Actions to Both
Consumers and Competitors
The enormous declines in the cost of information storage, manipula-
tion, and transmission continue to transform our economy at an amazingly
rapid pace. Information technology is changing the way numerous goods
and services are marketed and sold. Consumers shopping on computer
networks have access to far more information about products, suppliers,
and prices than they could possibly receive through mail-order, physical
search, and word-of-mouth.
The same technological advances which lead to better information
among consumers also lead to better information among rival sellers. It is
impossible to inform consumers electronically without also informing
competitors; if necessary a competitor can always pretend to be a consum-
er.
Compare the outcome in the gas station example with the two major
auto dealers in the same town. Although list prices of cars may be observ-
able by rivals, since each sale involves significant interactions between the
' See, e.g., Richard Posner, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the Gypsum and Engi-
neers Decisions, 67 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1187-91 (1979). However, if the information is secretly trans-
mitted to rivals in order to prevent consumers from acting upon the information (e.g., buying from
the lower priced firm), then that could be troubling.
[Vol. 5:3
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seller and the buyer, the possibility of negotiated prices is real. It becomes
impossible for competitors to determine a rival's transaction prices and
therefore, it becomes difficult to ascertain whether or not a rival is under-
cutting a cooperative price. Since it is difficult to detect cheating, it
becomes more difficult to enforce cooperative pricing. For example, a
seller may mistakenly believe when its sales decline that a rival has
undercut price and may respond with a price cut of its own.
Imperfect information among sellers, costly price changes, or long-
term commitments to prices all make it more difficult for firms to coordi-
nate pricing at non-competitive levels. The theoretical literature analyzing
the circumstances fostering coordination includes Stigler's classic article,2'
followed by a large amount of game-theoretic literature which refines
Stigler's insights. The main factors which affect the ability of an industry
to sustain cooperative pricing include reaction times, extent of incomplete
information, industry concentration, and asymmetries among the firms.
A decision by one firm to post list prices electronically, which its
competitor follows, may help transform the industry to one where competi-
tion looks like the gas station example. Thus, communication can have, at
least theoretically, an anticompetitive effect. This is no more powerful than
saying that telephony can be "anticompetitive" because it might enhance
express collusion. Since it may be impossible to communicate with con-
sumers without communicating with competitors, the welfare impact of
communication is ambiguous. Hence, the mere possibility of an
anticompetitive effect is not sufficient justification for an argument that
posting prices electronically is, or ought to be, illegal per se.
In fact, communication with consumers is typically procompetitive;
competition prospers when consumers are fully-informed.22 Consumers
who can find out about competitor's prices, product selection, and delivery
and service policies, are more likely to make an informed choice. A store
which is more attractive to a consumer because it has lower prices is more
likely to succeed in a market where consumers can become informed at
low cost. This is exactly how competition is supposed to work. A new
entrant may compete more effectively if it can communicate to consumers
2' George Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 61 (1964).
2 In general, empirical studies support the proposition that bans on price advertisements harm
consumers. See, e.g., Benham, supra note 13, at 352; Maurizi, The Effect of Laws Against Price Ad-
vertising: The Case of Retail Gasoline, 10 W. ECON. J. 321, 329 (1972); Steiner, Does Advertising
Lower Consumer Prices?, 37 J. MARKETING 19, 26 (1973); Cady, An Estimate of the Price Effects
of Restrictions on Drug Price Advertising, 14 ECON. INQUIRY 493, 510 (1976); Luksetich &
Lofgren, Price, Advertising, and Liquor Prices, 4 INDUS. ORG. REV. 13, 25 (1976); BOND, Er AL.,
BUREAU OF ECON., FTC, STAFF REPORT ON EFFECTS OF RESTRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING AND
COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE PROFESSIONS: THE CASE OF OPTOMETRY (1980); Ippolito, Consum-
er Protection Economics: A Selective Survey, in EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION ECONOMICS (Ippolito & Scheffman eds., 1986).
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at low cost to both parties. In turn, this may encourage entry and its
corresponding procompetitive effects. On-line bookstores, CD retailers, and
computer retailers are providing real competition to community retailers.
The anticompetitive effects described above are merely possibilities.
For instance, it is possible that competing firms were pricing cooperatively
prior to communicating prices and availability. Then, the only incremental
effects are procompetitive. It is also possible that sharing information has
no incremental effect on prices because, under both regimes, prices are
constrained by potential entry, buyer bargaining power, and substitute
products. Electronic communication with consumers could make it easier
to cut prices secretly, not more difficult. For example, it may be possible
for a consumer to play competitors off against one another when getting
price quotes through electronic mail and make offers and counteroffers
among a large number of sellers at very low cost. If electronic haggling
becomes important, it will be more difficult for competing firms to know
what prices rivals are charging and, thus, cooperative outcomes become
less likely.
These arguments should make clear that a careful analysis, rich in
industry structure and practice, which employs all available data would be
necessary to determine if the net incremental effects, if any, of particular
information sharing is beneficial or harmful to consumers.
B. Type of Information: Historical and Current
One form of communication which can change the game competitors
play-often in a procompetitive way-is sharing of recent historical
information about prices, production, revenue, and other relevant factors.
This is often accomplished through a trade association which collects the
data and then disseminates it to its members. Other mechanisms include
consulting firms which collect data from industry participants and share it
with their clients. This is very common among compensation consultants
who collect industry data on professional and managerial pay. In many
cases, the data is aggregated before it is distributed, making it difficult to
identify actions of specific competitors. Typically the information is not
shared with the public, except sometimes at a very aggregate level.
Such sharing can be procompetitive-it can make possible
"benchmarking" or the adoption of "best practices," for example, and
thereby sharing of information can lower cost and price. Sharing of this
type of information, however, also can facilitate cooperative pricing in the
same way that communicating current price data can. It may become easier
to detect cheating when individual competitor's historical and current pric-
es, costs, and output are observed. On the other hand, aggregating the data
largely removes the value of information in facilitating collusion. Further-
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more, there can be procompetitive benefits of information on past and
current conditions. Information about market conditions will allow firms to
plan more effectively and produce more efficiently.
The early jurisprudence of trade associations demonstrates the poten-
tial procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.' Although there is much
to criticize in the courts' analyses of the markets, the decision to apply a
rule of reason based on the effects in a particular market is correct.
Comparisons of these cases to those that could arise today from the com-
munication of information indicates that there is little justification for ap-
plying a rule of reason in the trade association cases but using a per se ap-
proach to attack current information transmission.
C. Repetition, Reputation and Communication of Future Actions
Some communication is about future actions. Communication may be
about future unilateral actions--"We plan to raise prices across-the-board
by 2% next month"-or contingent actions--"we will follow any price
increase less than 5% by competitors," or vague statements which could be
unilateral or contingent--"we believe that price increases on the order of
3% are in order."
There is no direct commitment to be truthful. Antitrust issues can be
raised by a firm issuing such a statement about future actions especially if
the speaker does do what it said. Such communication is called "cheap
talk" in the economic literature. This economic term refers to communica-
tion which neither reveals verifiable information nor is costly to the sender,
in that it has no direct effect on anyone's profits. A statement that a firm
plans to raise price "costs nothing," and creates no commitment. Nonethe-
less, cheap talk can have an effect by revealing information.24
Consider telling a competitor that, "if you raise price tomorrow we
will follow the next day." This is an action which reveals no verifiable
information nor does it signal information since it has no cost. If hearing
the message increases the recipient's belief in the likelihood that its price
increase will be matched, it makes the price increase more attractive. The
question becomes why the statement changes the belief-presumably the
sender will match the price increase if it is profit-maximizing and will not
if it is not. The answer, we believe, is that the sender could have or
develop a reputation for truthfulness. When this is the case, if the sender
3 See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); Maple Floor-
ing Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
2 See, e.g., Farrell & Gibbons, Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining, 48 J. ECON. THEORY 2-
21, 237 (1989).
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fails to follow the competitor's price increase it will reap a short-run
benefit, which will be offset by the costs from a future lack of credibility.
It is possible that a reputation for credibility will allow a competitor
to signal specific information. For example, an announcement about
demand conditions may be credible if competitors will eventually find out
if the announcement was truthful and the sender values a reputation for
truthfulness.
Economists have analyzed game-theoretic models of reputation and
the conditions needed to make the acquisition of a reputation possible.'
One insight from this literature is that reputation usually requires repeated
interactions. The reputation holder only has an incentive to maintain his
reputation if the parties with whom he will interact in the future will base
their future purchase decision on the reputation of the firm. A stand-alone
restaurant on an interstate highway has less of an incentive to maintain a
reputation for high quality than a neighborhood restaurant because future
customers of the stand-alone restaurant will not usually base their purchase
decisions on the reputation of the restaurant.
The dynamic requirements of reputation arguments imply that an
isolated statement like, "we would be willing to go along with an industry-
wide price increase" may not provide any credible information to the
recipient and may have no effect on the ability of firms to price coopera-
tively. A rule of reason inquiry should look at whether or not such state-
ments are likely to have an effect and whether in a particular case they
likely did have any effect given the details of industry structure and com-
petition.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATIONS
The recent action against the airline industry by The Antitrust Divi-
sion6 and the related class action case against the airlines are good
examples to illustrate our points."' In those cases, the airlines were alleged
to have "conspired" and to have reached a "price-fixing" agreement with
each other through the use of an electronic bulletin board. With the devel-
opment of new information technologies, airlines are able to post, in
electronic form, their fares on computer screens (actually each night they
submit a computer tape to the Airline Tariff Publishing Company which
2 The classic game-theoretic articles on reputation are Milgrom & Roberts, Predation, Reputa-
tion, & Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280 (1982); Kreps & Wilson, Reputation & Imper-
fect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982); and Kreps, et al., Rational Cooperation in the Fi-
nitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982).
11 United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g. Co., 1994-92 Trade Cas. 2854 (CCH) P 70,687
(1994).
Carlton, along with Lexecon, served as a consultant to the airlines.
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then disseminates the information to the public, including travel agents).
To avoid irrelevant details, suppose that fares can be instantaneously
changed and disseminated to competitors and travel agents.
For our purposes, there are three possible antitrust concerns. First,
prices were being communicated among rivals. Second, some of the fares
were not current fares, but fares to go into effect in the future. So, for
example, a fare increase would be indicated to go into effect next month.
Third, some of the "notes" accompanying the fare changes and appearing
on the bulletin board were alleged to contain messages of the following
sort: "I, airline X, will lower my fare at your hubs, airline Y, unless you
rescind your fare cuts at my hubs." Let us look at each concern in light of
the theories of this paper.
If two firms sat together in a room to establish a naked cartel by
agreeing to set specific prices and to serve specific routes, antitrust would
likely condemn-indeed condemn per se-that cartel. The mere meeting
by itself could not literally lead to a binding agreement for the reasons we
have already described-even if the rivals talk about and agree to specific
prices they will charge, there is no assurance that each will follow the
price recommendation and no court would enforce the cartel agreement.
Yet, the practice of explicit secret price fixing among rivals is a practice
that the antitrust laws have had experience with, and, after weighing the
benefits of allowing such activity, concluded that it is undesirable. Hence,
most courts (and we concur) undoubtedly would characterize the behavior
as a per se illegal price fixing scheme.
But how does a meeting to fix price, in which prices are discussed,
differ from a situation in which two firms are sitting at their computer
terminals rapidly changing prices in response to the others' actions? As
long as firms react more quickly than consumers, there may be no dif-
ference in effect or outcome (assuming that in each case only current
prices are communicated). Yet, in the case in which the firms do not meet
but instead use an electronic bulletin board to communicate prices, we
would apply the rule of reason.
The application of the rule of reason begins here with two questions.
First, if only rivals can see the information, should the antitrust laws allow
the practice? Second if rivals and consumers see the information, should
the antitrust laws allow the practice?
If the computer system has been designed specifically so that rivals
can communicate without allowing consumers to "hit" the low price
carrier, then that design may facilitate cooperative pricing. In a normal
market, those offering goods to sell at a high price stand the risk that they
will lose sales, while those with the low price incur the gain of increased
sales. In a system allowing rivals to first play a pricing game, and then
prices being shown to consumers, there is an increased risk that pricing
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coordination could occur compared to the case in which no pricing game
occurs beforehand. Although we still would apply the rule of reason, we
suspect that in such a case it is more likely that the effect would be to
injure consumers, making the practice unreasonable.
Suppose now that everyone (rivals plus consumers) sees the price
information at the same time. The rapid response of rivals to each other
may still be able to produce an outcome no different than that had they
met in a room. We see no single way to use antitrust to deal with the
problem and again no role for the per se rule. The price dissemination is
necessary for efficiency and its unavoidable consequence is that rivals can
respond. It is the standard oligopoly problem and our inclination is to
follow the traditional antitrust treatment that oligopoly behavior alone is
not actionable. This is a good case where, in order to determine whether an
action is bad, one must understand what the alternative is and whether it is
competitively better. Without being able to specify a superior alternative,
it is inappropriate for the antitrust laws to condemn an action. We suspect
that cases like this would tend to involve practices that benefit consumers
and thus likely are reasonable.'
The second antitrust issue relates to preannouncement of future
actions. This preannouncement is not binding and therefore allows rivals
to coordinate their pricing without bearing the usual cost of a high price.
So, for example, airline A announces that it will raise fares to $300 in four
weeks. Rival airline B announces a fare increase of $290 to take effect in
four weeks, at which point airline A fears a loss of sales and rescinds its
fare increase and matches the $290. Such communication can raise the
price by reducing the cost to a firm of being first to announce a fare
increase. But, and this is a big "but," the preannouncement of price
increases can provide a planning benefit to consumers. Even on monopoly
routes, airlines engage in announcements of future fare changes. Therefore,
the clear implication is that consumers must benefit from this practice. We
think it wrong to needlessly ban practices that can sometimes benefit
consumers significantly. Again, a rule of reason analysis is called for.
Moreover, it is always important to analyze what would occur if there
were a ban on the announcement of future prices. There are alternatives to
announcing future fares that still allow coordination. For example, future
fares could be tested out on a few seats. The fares could go into effect
immediately, but be limited to only a few seats. The fares would be
extended to all seats only if rivals signal that they will go along with such
2' Even if a superior alternative exists, there is the thorny issue whether antitrust liability can
be imposed on firms who have not adopted business practices that economists and lawyers believe
would produce more competition. As we will see, this issue is most difficult when the business
practices in question can sometimes be efficient.
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a general fare increase by matching their rival's fare on the few seat bas-
ket. Because this alternative is so good a substitute (from a cooperative
pricing perspective) for preannouncement, a ban on preannouncement
would only be effective if this alternative were also banned. However, a
ban on this alternative may be very costly, because fares limited to a few
seats are often efficient and the regulatory costs to enforce the ban may be
large. Furthermore, there may be other alternatives, which allow the initial
equilibrium to be reestablished. 9 The third antitrust issue has to do with
allegations that explicit messages were sent from one rival to another,
interpretable only by other rivals. Assuming the allegations were accurate,
there are at least two reasons to raise antitrust concerns here. First, the
extra communication is designed to facilitate reaching an equilibrium in a
complex product space of many routes. This type of signal would be very
hard to send if rivals were able to send information on only current prices.
Second, the signals were allegedly meant only for rivals, so it amounts to
secret communication among rivals unbeknownst to consumers. Again, we
would apply the rule of reason as the rule of decision, but we think the
practice likely would injure consumers and, therefore, be deemed unrea-
sonable in this specific context.
CONCLUSION
We have explained that the logic of the per se rule-that some
practices are so clearly anticompetitive that there are benefits in condemn-
ing them categorically-has little or no place in the emerging communi-
cation area. Instead the rule of decision in such cases must be the rule of
reason. This is so because communication can have ambiguous effects, and
because our experience with certain forms of communication is limited. To
determine whether a particular set of communication activities is or is not
anticompetitive one must understand the practice, the market and the con-
text in which the communication is occurring and then examine the likely
incremental effect of any challenged communication. Furthermore, one
must keep in mind that communication can help promote interdependence
among rivals and at the same time be essential to consumers in making
decisions and thus in enhancing competition.
9 Price announcements of future air fares have now been banned, but the effect of the ban is
in doubt. See Holman W. Jenkins, In Pursuit of Price Fixing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1996, at A19;
"Airlines have already shown that they can raise fares without benefit of electronic signals .... the
carriers will raise fares on weekends, when few tickets are sold. If rivals don't match the increase,
the carrier withdraws the fare on Monday. If everyone agrees, the increase sticks. The process may
not be as smooth as electronic signals, but the effect is the same." Joe Davidson, Six Big Airlines
Settle U.S. Suit on Price Fixing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1994, at A2.
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We propose that, at least for now, the rule of reason be the rule of
decision in cases involving communication, especially new forms of
information dissemination. Although we do not consider here the full de-
tails of rule of reason analysis, it suffices to say that such inquiries always
begin with an analysis of market power and that the core issues generally
include market power, the actual effect of any challenged practice and an
analysis of the likely benefits as well as the costs of all of the challenged
activities under investigation. We have mentioned a few issues likely to be
of particular relevance in information cases-whether information is public
or purely private, the currency of the information and the repetitive nature
of the information. These are general points and the particular effects of
information can not be ascertained in simple categories. The use of the rule
of reason implies that, as a practical matter, plaintiffs will not be able to
argue that communication itself is proof-either direct or circumstan-
tial-of price-fixing per se. Instead they will be forced to show that a
particular challenged communication practice has an anticompetitve effect.
That is the procedure we advocate because we are convinced that com-
munication is so important to the competitive process that broader sanc-
tions would likely chill competition rather than promote it.
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